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Abstract 
In studies looking at firm survival over the industry life cycle knowledge is one of the most 
important determinants. Different kinds of knowledge, namely post-entry experience, pre-
entry experience, and knowledge acquired by innovative activity positively influence the sur-
vival chances. This paper investigates how the kinds of knowledge are able to compensate 
each other. Therefore, a statistical survival analysis is performed for the German automobile 
industry (1886-1939) which applies an estimation approach that links instrumental variables 
with the Cox regression. The results highlight that innovative activity is able to compensate 
for lacking post-entry experience, supporting Schumpeterian creative destruction. 
JEL classification: L10, L62, O33, C41 
keywords: firm survival, patents, innovation, automobile industry, hazard rates 
 
                                                          
1   We are grateful to the participants in our sessions at the 2006 EEA conference in Vienna and the 2006 confer-
ence of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Bayreuth for their comments and suggestions. As usual, we are responsi-
ble for all remaining deficiencies. 
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1. Introduction 
Knowledge is an important aspect of economic life, but has received only a crude treatment in 
scientific economic analyses. This treatment frequently consists of the consideration of 
knowledge as an accumulable factor of production that contributes in the production function 
in addition to and just like labor, capital, materials, etc. by shifting the production function 
over time (Griliches (1979)). In the growth models of Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt 
(1992) microfoundations are provided that explain the (aggregate) effects of knowledge either 
by an increasing variety of intermediate products which are used to assemble the final product 
or by increasing the quality of these intermediate products. 
In evolutionary economics knowledge acquired by agents in an cumulative process is con-
ceived as incomplete. There are differences of the accumulated knowledge between the actors 
of an economy, so that they are heterogeneous. A detailed discussion of the role of knowledge 
in evolutionary economics can be found in Loasby (1999). There it is explored how the limi-
tations of human knowledge create opportunities as well as problems in a modern economy. 
In general, knowledge can be divided in knowing that (knowledge of facts, relationships and 
theories) and knowing how (ability to perfo m appropriate actions to achieve a desired result). 
Loasby (1999) describes the evolution of knowledge as a path-dependent process in which the 
acquirement of new knowledge depends on the knowledge accumulated before. Furthermore 
differences in knowledge arise from learning-by-doing in different activities as a result of the 
division of labor. In the following we restrict the notion knowledge to the knowing-how as-
pect. 
In the present article we deal with this aspect of knowledge as a key determinant of firm sur-
vival in the German automobile industry. The life-cycle literature distinguishes between 
knowledge that is already available in the firm at the time of entry (pre-entry experience), the 
knowledge that is accumulated during the operation in the market since entry (post-entry ex-
perience) and the knowledge that is explicitly associated with innovative activities (innovative 
experience). In this article we build on the work of Klepper (1996, 2002a,b) who uses survival 
analyses for the investigation of the life cycle of various U.S. industries, including the auto-
mobile industry. We apply this approach and assess the role of knowledge over the life cycle 
of the German automobile industry in the period 1886 to 1939. Our earlier results reported in 
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Cantner et al. (2006, 2008) show that each of the three types of knowledge has an independent 
effect on firm survival, even if all are included in the statistical analyses simultaneously. 
To extend these results, the specific focus of this article is an investigation of whether and to 
which extent the three forms of know-how are able to compensate each other. In particular, 
we are interested in assessing whether an early entry in the industry which is associated with 
relatively more opportunities to accumulate post-entry experience is able to compensate for 
lacking pre-entry experience and likewise whether innovative experience since entry is able to 
compensate for lacking pre- or post-entry experience, respectively. Analyses of this type also 
appear in Klepper and Simons (2005) as part of their evaluation of the empirical validity of 
different theoretical explanations for industry shakeouts. 
Following these introductory remarks we treat the three forms of compensation (pre-entry 
versus post-entry experience, pre-entry experience versus innovative experience and post-
entry experience versus innovative experience) in the next three sections. A particularly illu-
minating interpretation in terms of Schumpeterian creative destruction is associated with the 
compensation of lacking post-entry exp rience as a result of late entry into the industry by 
innovative experience since entry. Section 5 concludes. Two appendices deal with the data 
sources, the definition of the variables and the solution to the simultaneity problem that arises 
in the econometric analysis. 
 
2. Compensation I: Pre-Entry versus Post-Entry Experience 
Starting with the compensation of pre-entry and post-entry experience we divide the firms of 
our sample into four disjoint groups. It is assumed that pre-entry experience exists if a firm is 
either an experienced entrepreneur, a spinoff or a diversifying firm. Post-entry experience is 
assumed to be associated with the time of entry as quantified by the division of the firms into 
four entry cohorts. Firms that entered in the first (from 1886 to 1901) or second entry cohorts 
(from 1902 to 1906) are classified as early entrants and firms that entered in the third (from 
1907 to 1922) or forth cohorts (from 1923 to 1939) are classified as late entrants. Based on 
that we divide our sample of firms into the group of firms that entered early and are endowed 
with pre-entry experience (early experienced firms), the group of firms that entered late and 
are endowed with pre-entry experience (late experienced firms), the group of firms that en-
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tered early and are not endowed with pre-entry experience (early inexperienced firms) and 
finally the group of firms that entered late and are not endowed with pre-entry experience 
(late inexperienced firms). Appendix A contains the relevant information about the data 
sources and the definition of the indicators for pre-entry and post-entry experience, as well as 
the indicator of innovative experience that will be required further below. 
This classification into early and late as well as experienced and inexperienced firms is typi-
cally used in a statistical survival analyses to assess the impact of the different knowledge 
types on the survival rate or the exit hazard of the firms. The methods applied there consist of 
the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier estimator of survivor curves (Kaplan and Meier (1958)) and 
the semiparametric Cox regression for the hazard rate (Cox (1972)). Both methods are able to 
take account for the right censored nature of the data. Since space considerations prevent a 
detailed discussion of these methods, we refer the interested reader to Kiefer (1988) or Lan-
caster (1990) for more general treatments of methods for survival analysis and references to 
economic applications. 
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Estimates for Pre-Entry versus Post-Entry Experience 
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For the case of pre-entry versus post-entry experience figure 1 depicts the survivor curves 
estimated by the Kaplan-Meier estimator on a logarithmic scale. In this exercise firms in the 
first two entry cohorts are considered as early entrants, whereas firms in the last two entry 
cohorts are considered as late entrants. As can be easily discerned from the figure, early ex-
perienced firms have the best survival chances since their survival curve is the flattest and is 
thus associated with the smallest hazard rate. Analogously, late inexperienced firms have the 
worst survival chances and the largest hazard rates. Most interesting is the comparison of the 
early inexperienced with the late experienced firms. The associated survivor curves suggest 
that late experienced firms have a smaller exit hazard than the early inexperienced firms. This 
implies that the existence of pre-entry experience is able to compensate for the disadvantages 
accruing from late entry into the market. The two survivor curves are not significantly differ-
ent in a statistical sense, however, in contrast to the visual impression. Applying the family of 
tests described in Harrington and Fleming (1982), i.e. the variant associated with setting the 
parameter ρ equal to zero, gives a p-value of about 0.34 in that case. In contrast, all other sur-
vivor curves are indeed significantly different from each other with very low p-values. 
More exact statements about the compensation of pre-entry and post-entry experience can be 
gained from an application of the Cox regression. In this method, the hazard rate of firm i out 
of a sample of n firms that survives for at least it  years 
nithth iii ,...,1,)exp()()( 0 =⋅= βx  
can be divided into the baseline hazard rate )(0 ith  depending exclusively on the duration of 
survival and a second part depending on the values of the explanatory variables for firm i, 
contained in the row vector ix , mediated by the exponential function. The method of partial 
maximum likelihood estimation allows to estimate the parameters in the vector β  without 
requiring to estimate the baseline hazard rate which gives the whole procedure a distinct 
semiparametric flavor (see again Kiefer (1988) or Lancaster (1990) for the details). 
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Table 1 
Cox Regressions for Pre-Entry versus Post-Entry Experience 
 
  Model (A) Model (B) Model (C) 
  cohort 1 vs. 
cohorts 2-4 
cohorts 1-2 vs. 
cohorts 3-4 
cohorts 1-3 vs. 
cohort 4 
(1) early experienced firms -1.163 
(0.000) 
-1.044 
(0.000) 
-0.999 
(0.000) 
(2) late experienced firms -0.385 
(0.087) 
-0.211 
(0.280) 
-0.041 
(0.840) 
(3) late inexperienced firms 0.501 
(0.029) 
0.603 
(0.001) 
1.055 
(0.000) 
 R2 0.202 0.234 0.278 
 n 333 333 333 
 t-statistic for (1) – (2) -3.570 
(0.000) 
-4.716 
(0.000) 
-4.544 
(0.000) 
 t-statistic for (2) – (3) -6.772 
(0.000) 
-5.644 
(0.000) 
-4.375 
(0.000) 
Note: p-values in parentheses below the coefficients. 
 
In the present case the vector ix  contains the three dummy variables indicating the affiliation 
to the groups of the early experienced, late experienced and late inexperienced firms, 
respectively. Since the four group classification of the firms is exhaustive, one category has to 
be omitted from the regressions. Here, this omitted category is the group of the early inexpe-
rienced firms so that the parameter estimates represent the differences of the hazard rates of 
the other groups relative to that reference group. All three possibilities to divide the firms in 
the four entry cohorts into early and late entrants are explored and the results for the Cox re-
gressions are shown in the columns of table 1. Accordingly, in model (A) the firms are di-
vided between the first and the second entry cohorts, so that the firms of the first cohort are 
considered as the early entrants and the firms of the second, third and forth cohorts are con-
sidered as the late entrants. Analogously, in model (B) the division is between the second and 
the third entry cohorts (as in figure 1) and in model (C) it is between the third and the forth 
entry cohorts. 
Considering the first two rows of the table which show the parameter estimates for the experi-
enced firms, we observe that all parameter estimates have a negative sign. The parameter es-
timates for the group of early experienced firms are largest in absolute magnitude and statisti-
cally different from zero (as is evident from the p-values in parentheses below the parameter 
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estimates). This implies that the early experienced firms have the lowest exit hazards of all 
groups. This finding holds irrespective of where the division in early and late entrants has 
been implemented. Opposed to that, the parameter estimates for the late inexperienced firms 
are consistently positive and significantly different from zero (on 5 percent level or lower), 
implying the highest exit hazards and the worst survival chances for the firms in this group. 
For the group of late experienced firms the reduction of the hazard rate that is associated with 
negative parameter estimates which are, however, only significant on a 10 percent level in the 
case of model (A). Accepting this higher error probability, one can state that firms with pre-
entry experience that entered late into the market are faced with a lower exit risk compared to 
firms of the reference group that entered early but were not endowed with pre-entry experi-
ence if earliness means membership in the first entry cohort. In this case pre-entry experience 
is able to compensate for the disadvantages of late entry. Unfortunately, this form of compen-
sation is only weakly supported by the data because it is found only in the case of model (A) 
and there only on a 10 percent level of significance, but not in the case of models (B) and (C). 
Further results reported in the table concern the differences of the exit hazards within the 
group of experienced firms (comparing the parameter estimates in rows (1) and (2)) and 
within the group of late entrants (comparing the parameter estimates in rows (2) and (3)). The 
associated results for the t-statistics of the differences of the parameter estimates show that the 
parameter estimates are significantly different with essentially zero p-values. This confirms 
our findings in Cantner et al. (2006) that pre-entry experience and post-entry experience play 
their own role in reducing the exit hazard. Related findings are reported in Klepper (2002a) 
for the U.S. automobile industry. The overall fit of the regressions can be judged from the row 
R2 and appears to be quite reasonable in all three regressions. 
 
3. Compensation II: Pre-Entry Experience versus Innovative Experience 
We now turn to the investigation of the relation of the pre-entry experience and innovative 
experience. Innovative experience is assumed to be associated with patenting (see e.g. Grili-
ches (1990)). Specifically, innovative experience is quantified by a dummy variable that is 
equal to unity if a firm got granted at least one patent since it entered the automobile industry. 
Combining this variable with the information about pre-entry experience we can again divide 
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divide the firms of our sample into four exhaustive groups. We are able to distinguish firms 
that are endowed with pre-entry experience and have been innovative since market entry (ex-
perienced innovators), firms that are not endowed with pre-entry experience and have been 
innovative since market entry (inexperienced innovators), firms that are endowed with pre-
entry experience but have not been innovative since market entry (experienced noninnovators) 
and finally firms that are not endowed with pre-entry experience and have not been innovative 
since market entry (inexperienced noninnovators). 
The graphical analysis of the survival chances of these four groups is shown in figure 2. The 
survivor curves are again estimated by the Kaplan-Meier estimator. The figure clearly shows 
that the experienced innovators have by far the best survival chances, whereas the inexperi-
enced noninnovators have the highest exit hazards. The survivor curves of the inexperienced 
innovators and the experienced noninnovators are rather close and the test of Harrington and 
Fleming (1982) does not reject the equality of these two survivor curves. Besides this excep-
tion all other survivor curves are statistically significantly different from each other. 
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Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier Estimates for Pre-Entry Experience versus Innovative Experience 
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The inference based on the Kaplan-Meier estimates may, however, be flawed since the as-
sessment of the effect of a firms innovative experience since entry on its hazard rate and 
therefore on its duration of survival may be associated with a simultaneity problem. The rea-
son is that the longer the duration of survival of a firm, the higher is the probability of receiv-
ing at least one patent grant (and the higher is also the expected number of patents granted). 
Thus, the patent variable is likely to be jointly determined with the duration. This implies that 
using any information contained in the patent data that refers to the period in which a firm 
actually operates possibly leads to inconsistent coefficient estimates. In econometrics, meth-
ods of instrumental variable estimation (also referred to as two-stage least squares) have been 
developed in order to achieve consistent estimates in such situations. To solve the simultane-
ity problem we combine the idea of instrumental variables estimation with the Cox regression 
and apply the bootstrap for computing correct standard errors (see appendix B for a detailed 
description of the approach taken). 
 
Table 2 
Cox Regression for Pre-Entry Experience versus Innovative Experience 
 
  Model (D) 
(1) experienced innovators -1.763 
(0.000) 
(2) inexperienced innovators -1.645 
(0.104) 
(3) inexperienced noninnovators 0.575 
(0.027) 
 R2 0.226 
 n 333 
 t-statistic for (1) – (2) 0.117 
(0.906) 
 t-statistic for (2) – (3) -2.022 
(0.043) 
Note: in parentheses below the coefficients are the p-values based on bootstrapped 
standard errors as explained in appendix B. 
 
For the instrumental variable estimates of the Cox regression reported in table 2 (model (D)) 
the set of instruments consists of variables that are fixed at the time of entry and can therefore 
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not be affected by the subsequent events. In particular, as instruments are used the dummy 
variables for the first three entry cohorts, the dummy variables for the type of pre-entry ex-
perience, a dummy variable indicating innovative experience prior to market entry (equal to 
unity if patents are granted for the founder before the firm enters the automobile industry), the 
number of patents granted before market entry and its square as well as several interactions of 
the patent variables with the cohort dummies and the dummies for the type of pre-entry ex-
perience. 
The results show that the parameter estimates for both groups of innovators are negative, irre-
spective of their pre-entry experience. Although the estimates are only in the case of the ex-
perienced innovators statistically significant on 5 percent level, the magnitude of both pa-
rameter estimates is quite similar. Thus, with respect to the omitted reference group of the 
experienced noninnovators, innovating firms generally tend to have systematically better sur-
vival chances. This further supports our findings reported in Cantner et al. (2008). As ex-
pected, the inexperienced noninnovating firms are faced with the highest exit hazard, even 
higher than that of the reference group and statistically significant on 5 percent level. Based 
on these estimates we have to be a little bit cautious with our conclusions regarding the com-
pensation of pre-entry experience by innovative experience. The parameter that is associated 
with the dummy variable for the inexperienced innovators and that reflects the difference of 
the hazard rate to the experienced noninnovators has a p-value slightly above 0.1. Given that 
this parameter estimate is indeed negative, this would imply that inexperienced innovators 
have a lower exit hazard than experienced noninnovators. In that case, the disadvantages ac-
cruing from lacking experience before market entry can be compensated by innovative ex-
perience since the time of entry. 
In addition to these results the differences within the group of innovating firms (comparing 
(1) and (2)) and the differences within the group of inexperienced firms (comparing (2) and 
(3)) are also tested. The reported t-statistics show that the differences within the group of in-
novating firms are not statistically significant on conventional levels, but the differences 
within the group of inexperienced firms are. Thus, for innovating firms the existence of ex-
perience before market entry or the lack of that form of knowledge does not make a difference 
regarding their exit hazards. This may be explained to some extent by the depreciation of pre-
entry experience (analogous to Carroll et al. (1996)) and further supports the assertion that 
innovative experience can compensate for lacking pre-entry experience. In contrast, for the 
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inexperienced firms it is very important to be innovative for achieving improvements of their 
survival chances. 
4. Compensation III: Post-Entry Experience versus Innovative Experience 
The final compensation relationship we want to investigate is that between post-entry experi-
ence and innovative experience since market entry. Therefore, we again construct four groups 
of firms: firms that entered early and were innovative since entry (early innovators), firms that 
entered late and were innovative since entry (late innovators), firms that entered early but 
were not innovative since entry (early noninnovators) and finally firms that entered late and 
were not innovative since entry (late noninnovators). Again, the three different possibilities to 
define early and late entry provided by the four cohorts are explored. 
0 10 20 30 40 50
0.
02
0.
05
0.
10
0.
20
0.
50
1.
00
time since entry
pe
rc
en
t s
ur
vi
va
l (
lo
g 
sc
al
e)
early innovators
late innovators
early noninnovators
late noninnovators
 
Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier Estimates for Post-Entry Experience versus Innovative Experience 
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Figure 3 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor curves for all four groups, where 
the firms in the first two entry cohorts are treated as early entrants and the firms in the last 
two entry cohorts are treated as late entrants. This figure provides a clear ranking of the four 
groups with respect to the survival chances of their member firms. The early innovators have 
the best survival chances, followed by the late innovators. Compared to that, noninnovating 
firms have larger exit hazards, with the early noninnovators being more successful than the 
late noninnovators. Application of the Harrington-Fleming test shows that the differences 
between all four survivor curves are statistically significant with very low p-values (all below 
0.0025). 
Especially the statistically significant difference between the survivor curves of the late inno-
vators and the early noninnovators opens up a very appealing economic interpretation. This 
difference shows that firms that are faced with the disadvantage of being late in the market 
but are innovative once entered have better survival chances than firms that have the advan-
tage of entering early but are not innovative since their entry. Thus, the disadvantages of late 
entry can be compensated by innovative experience which implies that young innovative 
firms tend to replace old, but noninnovative firms. This pattern resembles exactly the process 
that Schumpeter (1942) had in mind when he coined the notion of “creative destruction”, 
which he described as revolutionizing “the economic structure from within, incessantly de-
stroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” (Schumpeter 1942, p. 83; emphasis in 
the original). 
A possible source of bias that may render the Kaplan-Meier estimates erroneous is the simul-
taneity problem already discussed at some length in the previous section. To safeguard against 
this possibility, we again apply the instrumental variable Cox regression to this form of com-
pensation. The set of instrumental variables is the same as that used in the previous section. 
Table 3 shows the corresponding results for three regressions with the three alternative divi-
sions of the firms into early and late entrants. In model (E) only the firms of the first entry 
cohort are considered as early entrants, whereas in model (F) the firms of the first two cohorts 
and in model (G) the firms of the first three cohorts are considered as early entrants. It is im-
portant to note first that all parameter estimates are significantly different from zero, the sole 
exception being the parameter estimate pertaining to the late noninnovators in model (E). Re-
call that the parameter estimates in rows (1), (2) and (3) here again represent the deviations 
from the hazard rate of the omitted reference group of the early noninnovators. 
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Table 3 
Cox Regressions for Post-Entry Experience versus Innovative Experience 
 
  Model (E) Model (F) Model (G) 
  cohort 1 vs. 
cohorts 2-4 
cohorts 1-2 vs. 
cohorts 3-4 
cohorts 1-3 vs. 
cohort 4 
(1) early innovators -2.224 
(0.002) 
-1.956 
(0.001) 
-2.170 
(0.000) 
(2) late innovators -2.197 
(0.000) 
-1.588 
(0.000) 
-1.547 
(0.004) 
(3) late noninnovators 0.333 
(0.399) 
0.739  
(0.008) 
0.760 
(0.000) 
 R2 0.206 0.250 0.264 
 n 333 333 333 
 t-statistic for (1) – (2) -0.051 
(0.959) 
-0.730 
(0.465) 
-1.082 
(0.279) 
 t-statistic for (2) – (3) -4.891 
(0.000) 
-4.965 
(0.000) 
-3.743 
(0.000) 
Note: in parentheses below the coefficients are the p-values based on bootstrapped standard errors as 
explained in appendix B.  
 
The results confirm that innovating firms have consistently lower exit hazards than noninno-
vating firms, irrespective of their time of entry. Among the noninnovating firms, those classi-
fied as late noninnovators have higher exit hazards than the reference group of the early non-
innovators (this finding, however, is not significant in the case of model (E)). Late innovators 
have substantially better survival chances compared to late noninnovators, as the respective t-
statistics for the coefficient difference (2) – (3) show. The hazard rates for the early innova-
tors are slightly lower than that of the late innovators, but this difference is not statistically 
significant as the respective t-statistics for (1) – (2) show. These findings parallel the analo-
gous results of Klepper and Simons (2005, table 4) for the U.S. automobile industry regarding 
sign as well as significance and actually roughly resemble the magnitude of the parameter 
estimates. 
Most important is the significantly negative parameter estimate for the late innovators show-
ing that firms that entered late but are innovative since then are faced with lower exit hazards 
compared to the reference group of the early noninnovators. The finding that innovative ex-
perience is able to compensate for the disadvantages of late entry supports the conclusions 
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from the Kaplan-Meier estimates. Moreover, this compensation consistently holds across all 
definitions of late and early entrants with respect to statistical significance and is also of con-
siderable magnitude. The hazard rate of late innovators is about 78 to 89 percent lower than 
that of the early noninnovators. All this strongly suggests that the force of Schumpeterian 
creative destruction appears to be a very robust and quantitatively important finding in the 
German automobile industry. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
Summarizing the findings discussed above, it can be concluded that firms with pre-entry ex-
perience tend to be better off than inexperienced firms, that early entrants tend to be better off 
than late entrants and that innovative firms (with at least one patent since entry) tend to be 
better off than noninnovative firms, always expressed in terms of survival chances. Moreover, 
each of the three knowledge components has a separate effect on the exit hazard as found by 
Cantner et al. (2008). The value added of this article consists of a detailed examination of the 
possibility that one knowledge component dominates another knowledge component in that it 
is able to compensate for the lack of the other knowledge component, again expressed in 
terms of survival chances. These results are not restricted to the German automobile industry; 
the already mentioned article of Klepper and Simons (2005) reports similar results for several 
U.S. industries. 
Regarding this compensation issue the results give a rather weak indication for the compensa-
tion of post-entry knowledge by pre-entry knowledge, a marginally significant indication of 
compensation of pre-entry knowledge by innovative experience and a strongly significant 
indication of compensation of post-entry knowledge by innovative experience. Thus, the rela-
tion of the three knowledge components satisfies transitivity with innovative knowledge 
weakly dominating pre-entry knowledge and pre-entry knowledge weakly dominating post-
entry knowledge. Furthermore, the results reported above establish that knowledge accumu-
lated by innovative experience is able to compensate for lacking pre-entry and post-entry ex-
perience. This gives rise to the conclusion that knowledge accumulated by innovative experi-
ence is the single most important type of knowledge for long-run firm survival.  
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This finding is so important because the decision to innovate can be made by the firm itself, 
whereas pre-entry experience and time of entry are fixed once a firm enters the market. So 
firms are able to improve their survival chances by engaging in innovative experience, but 
they can not influence their pre-entry experience or their time of entry. Thus, the survival 
chances of firms are not fixed at the time of entry because of their founding characteristics, 
instead they can be actively influenced by their decision about innovative experience. This is 
another lesson taught by Schumpeter and his successors. 
 
Appendix A: Data Sources and Variable Definitions 
The basis of the statistical analyses performed in this paper is a data set of German firms 
which produce automobiles during the period 1886 to 1939,2 their experience before they en-
tered into the market and the patents they hold. The data set is the same as used in Cantner et 
al. (2008). We have collected data only for automobile manufacturing firms, excluding their 
suppliers and trucks producers. The data we gathered pertain to the year of entry (start of the 
automobile production), the year of exit (due to the stop of the automobile production, merg-
ers or acquisitions). Relevant for the survival analysis is the number of years a firm was actu-
ally producing automobiles and not the number of years in which the firm merely existed. We 
further collected data regarding the type of entry (explained below).  
The data are assembled from a multitude of different sources, such as yearbooks, historical 
and statistical journals and books about veteran cars. The most important sources are Doyle 
and Georgano (1963), Flik (2001), Köhler (1966), Kubisch (1983), Oswald (1996), Schrader 
(2002), von Fersen (1967, 1968) and von Seherr-Thoss (1979). From these sources we identi-
fied 441 firms that produced automobiles at some time during 1886 to 1939. The data are cen-
sored at 1939 after which the German economy became increasingly regulated and adapted to 
war production. As in Köhler (1966) we assign 1915 as the year of exit to those firms that exit 
the market as a cause of World War I. The peak of the number of firms is reached in 1924 
with 139 firms. Thereafter the German automobile industry experienced the typical shakeout 
and the number of firms declined to 26 until the year 1939. 
                                                          
2 The history of the German automobile industry started in 1886 with the inventions of Gottlieb Daimler and 
Karl Benz, who worked independent of each other. 
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(1) Pre-entry experience 
The classification of the type of entry is implemented according to Klepper (2002b). He dis-
tinguishes experienced firms (firms that diversify into the production of automobiles originat-
ing from other industries), experienced entrepreneurs (de novo firms whose founder headed 
and typically owned a part of another firm before), spinoffs (de novo firms whose founder 
worked in the automobile industry before) and inexperienced firms. Firms that produced 
automobiles, were forced to exit and later on produced automobiles again are treated as dif-
ferent firms and are classified as spinoffs when they enter the market a second time.  
(2) Post-entry experience 
The classification of the entry cohorts is based on Klepper (2002a). He defines the cohorts so 
that there are at least 15 firms in every cohort which survived for at least 15 years. This pro-
cedure results in four entry cohorts, the first with 56 firms ranging from 1886 to 1901, the 
second with 52 firms from 1902 to 1906, the third with 126 firms from 1907 to 1922 and the 
fourth with 115 firms from 1923 to 1939. In the fourth cohort there are 11 firms that survived 
for at least 15 years. Together with the information about the pre-entry experience, a total of 
333 observations is available for the survival analysis. 
(3) Innovative experience 
The data about a firm’s innovative experience are based on the patent grants of these firms. 
The search procedure is described in detail by Cantner et al. (2008). Since this procedure was 
based on the patent documents it is evident that patent grants are used, but recorded in the 
data set is the year of the application. The reason is that although there is a time lag between 
the application and the grant (see Griliches (1990)), the knowledge represented by the innova-
tion is available for the firm at least since the date of application. Some patents were applied 
together by two or more automobile firms. These patents were assigned to all applying firms, 
justified by the argument of Romer (1990) that the firms can use the associated know-how 
simultaneously. In the case of mergers and acquisitions, the patents of the merged (respec-
tively acquired) firms were assigned to the new firm. As an example, after the merger of 
Wanderer, DKW, Horch and Audi to Auto-Union in 1932 (recorded in the data set as DKW), 
all patents that were applied for by Wanderer, Horch or Audi were assigned to DKW as the 
continuing firm. 
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All results reported in this article are based on the sample of the 333 firms for which all re-
quired data are available. Mergers and acquisitions are treated as in Klepper (2002a, p. 42). In 
the cases of mergers the firm with the same name as the new group or the largest firm (if the 
new group has a new name) is treated as continuing, the others are treated as censored exits. 
In the case of acquisitions, the absorbing firm is treated as continuing if it produces automo-
biles and the acquired firm is treated as a censored exit. If the absorbing firm does not pro-
duce automobiles, the acquired firm is treated as continuing. 
 
Appendix B: Cox Regression with Instrumental Variables 
Our estimation methodology relies on three basic building blocks. It combines (1) the idea of 
generalized instrumental variables estimation (GIVE) with (2) the semiparametric Cox regres-
sion. Since the standard errors (and therefore t-statistics and p-values) of the regression coef-
ficients obtained from this procedure do not adequately reflect the additional estimation un-
certainty that is introduced by the construction of the instrumental variables, corrected stan-
dard errors are computed by (3) the design matrix variant of the bootstrap. 
(1) Instrumental Variables 
In this procedure the endogenous regressors are projected on to the space spanned by the ex-
ogenous regressors and the instruments in the first step, which are chosen to assure their un-
correlatedness with the error terms. Considered as instrumental variables are only those vari-
ables that represent characteristics of the firms which are fixed once and for all before their 
entry into the automobile industry. The guiding idea is that such predetermined variables 
represent information that may have an effect on the duration of survival but are by 
construction not affected by the duration themselves. Among the data series available, the 
cohort dummies, the classification of pre-entry experience and the number of patent grants 
before the recorded time of entry are valid candidates for instrumental variables. 
Let n denote the sample size and k the number of explanatory regressors on the right hand 
side of the regression equation and define X as the n×k matrix of all (exogenous and endoge-
nous) regressors and W as the n×l matrix (with kl ≥ ) containing both exogenous regressors 
and instruments. Both matrices are assumed to contain a column of ones representing the in-
tercept. Then the linear projection of X on to W is equivalent to the matrix operation 
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XWWWWX ')'(ˆ 1−=  where the prime denotes matrix transposition. This amounts to the 
calculation of the fitted values of a linear regression of the columns of X on W. Accordingly, 
since the exogenous regressors are contained in W this operation does not affect the columns 
of the exogenous regressors but expresses the endogenous regressors as optimal (in the least 
squares sense) linear combinations of the variables in W. Since all variables in W are prede-
termined by assumption, the variables in the resulting matrix Xˆ  are exogenous as well by the 
properties of orthogonal projections (see Davidson and MacKinnon (2003, pp. 57ff.) for more 
on the geometry of orthogonal projections). The matrix X of the original regressors is subse-
quently replaced by Xˆ  for the estimation of the Cox regression in the second step. 
(2) Cox Regression 
In this second step the semiparametric Cox regression (Cox (1972)) is executed in order to 
estimate the parameters β of the hazard rate 
)ˆexp()()( 0 βx iii thth ⋅=  
specified in proportional hazards form, where )(0 ith  denotes the baseline hazard rate that 
exclusively depends on the duration of firm i, it , and ixˆ  denotes the ith row of Xˆ , ni ,...,1= . 
The parameters are estimated by maximizing the so-called partial likelihood function, which 
allows us to estimate β independent of the specific functional form of the baseline hazard rate, 
simultaneously accounting for the effects of censoring. In practice, numerical and tractability 
considerations lead to the maximization of the log of the partial likelihood function. The abil-
ity of the Cox regression to estimate β without requiring the specification of the functional 
form of the baseline hazard rate underscores the semiparametric character of the procedure. 
The resulting estimate is denoted by βˆ . A brief and illuminating exposition of the reasoning 
underlying the partial likelihood estimation is given by Kiefer (1988).3 
                                                          
3 A further problem may be suspected in the application of the linear projections of the first stage to dummy 
variables since the result of the projection operation is unlikely to be a dummy variable itself. However, results 
reported in Angrist (1999) justify our procedure. Even more forcefully Angrist and Krueger (2001, p. 80) argue 
that “using a linear regression for the first-stage estimates generates consistent second-stage estimates even with 
a dummy endogenous variable. Moreover, using a nonlinear first stage to generate fitted values that are plugged 
directly into the second-stage equation does not generate consistent estimates unless the nonlinear model hap-
pens to be exactly right, a result which makes the dangers of misspecification high”. 
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(3) Design Matrix Bootstrap 
The preceding two steps of our approach will produce consistent estimates of the parameters, 
but the raw combination of these two methods will result in flawed statistical inference since 
the regressors used are generated by the projection operation in the first step. To obtain stan-
dard errors that are corrected for these biases, the design matrix variant of the bootstrap (al-
ternatively called bootstrapping cases or bootstrapping pairs) is used (see Davison and 
Hinkley (1997) for a general reference on bootstrapping). According to Davison and Hinkley 
(1997, p. 87) this procedure is also justified in the present case of censored data if the censor-
ing information is included in the process of repeated sample drawing. 
The p-values that are reported jointly with the coefficient estimates of the instrumental vari-
ables variant of the Cox regression are throughout computed with the aid of the design matrix 
bootstrap. This approach usually performs well even if some forms of heteroskedasticity are 
present. The design matrix bootstrap is based on randomly drawn samples (with replacement), 
each of size n from the rows of the original data ),,,( WXdy , where y contains the duration 
data, i.e. )',...,( 1 ntt=y . Note that the data also include the instrumental variables as well as 
the censoring information in the n×1 dummy vector d. The resulting bootstrap samples are 
denoted by ),,,( **** WXdy . Repeating this procedure B times and conducting the first two 
steps for each bootstrap sample results in B different bootstrap estimates for the Cox 
regression coefficients, denoted **1 ˆ,...,ˆ Bββ . From these the bootstrap estimate of the covariace 
matrix of the coefficients is computed by 
∑ =− −−⋅−= Bb bbB 1 ****1* )'ˆ)(ˆ()1(ˆ ββββV , 
where *1
1* ˆΣ b
B
bB ββ =
− ⋅= . The p-values for the null hypothesis 0:0 =jβH  for the jth 
coefficient is then based on the t-statistic 2/1* )ˆ(ˆ −⋅= jjjj vβτ  which is distributed as standard 
normal asymptotically. In this formula *ˆ jjv  denotes the jth diagonal element of the bootstrap 
covariance matrix *Vˆ and is thus a correct estimate for the variance of the jth regression 
coefficient, },...,1{ kj∈ . Since the test is two-tailed, the p-values can be explicitly computed 
by |))(|Φ1(2ˆ jj τp −= , where )(Φ ⋅  denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. 
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All p-values that are reported in this paper are based on 1000=B  bootstrap replications. This 
is much more than actually necessary to satisfy the rule of thumb recommending that “seldom 
are more than 200=B  replications needed for estimating a standard error” (Efron and 
Tibshirani (1993, p. 52)). 
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